




Pesticide regulation has become a topic of increas-
ing interest in recent years, owing to rising public
concerns about residues on foods, in drinking-
water wells, and damage to wildlife. Public-
opinion polls and political responses to incidents
like the controversy over Alar suggest that demand
for government intervention to protect public
health and the environment from pesticides is high.
Pesticides are toxic by design; survey evidence in-
dicates that they are perceived as riskier than other,
more common pollutants like auto exhaust (see,
for example, Horowitz). Pesticide residues are not
easily observable (short of laboratory analysis),
making averting strategies by individuals ex-
tremely difficult ancl/or excessively costly to im-
plement.
Most economists studying macro-scale issues of
pesticide regulation have focused their attention
on decisions about whether to allow the use (cancel
the registration) of specific chemicals or classes of
chemicals. For example, Knutson et al., and
Osteen and Kuchler studied the effects of eliminat-
ing pesticide use on major crops in the U.S. Zil-
berman et al. examined the likely effects of Cali-
fornia’s’ ‘Big Green” initiative, which would have
eliminated the use of many widely used chemicals
on five major fruit and vegetable crops in that
state. Cropper et al. investigated the political eco-
nomic factors determining Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) cancellation decisions.
This emphasis on registration decisions is un-
derstandable: Bans are the most dramatic, visible
tool of pesticide regulation and thus engender the
most controversy. But the reality of pesticide reg-
ulation is more complex. Pesticide regulation as it
exists today utilizes a number of policy instru-
ments other than all-or-nothing registration/
cancellations or even other forms of direct restric-
tions on pesticide use. Moreover, even though our
natural inclination is to concentrate on the total
amount of pesticides applied, timing of application
and the form in which the pesticide is applied are
often equally important in terms of both produc-
tivity and negative spillovers.
This paper discusses some strengths and weak-
nesses of alternative approaches to pesticide regu-
lation. It begins with a brief description of the
goals of pesticide regulation and the various policy
instruments used to address those goals. It then
turns to alternative types of policies, such as pes-
ticide taxes, liability law, and provision of infor-
mation, and considers their potential for meeting
the goals of pesticide regulation. Finally, it dis-
cusses needs for economic research in light of cur-
rent knowledge about these alternatives.
Goals of Pesticide Regulation
Pesticides are regulated by the EPA primarily un-
der two statutes: the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), most recently
amended in 1988, and the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). FIFRA governs pesticide
use directly, while FFDCA affects it indirectly by
giving EPA the authority to set tolerances for res-
idues on foods.
Pesticide regulation is mandated to provide pro-
tection for (1) pesticide users, (2) the health and
safety of humans exposed to pesticides, and (3)
wildlife and the environment.
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1There is a voluminous literature on the farm-level economics of
pesticide use. Here we refer only tn studies that have examinedpesticide
policy at the national level.
Pesticide-User Protection
The purpose of the original FIFRA legislation was
to ensure that the chemicals farmers were being
sold were actually effective in controlling the spe-
cific pests they were purported to. This function of
regulation may be important for health and safety,
as well as for permitting efficient use of materials.84 October 1992
For example, Boardman attributes many of the
health and safety, and environmental problems as-
sociated with pesticide use in Malaysia to the fact
that farmers are sold mislabeled and adulterated
chemicals,
Market failures in this regard arise from the fact
that product quality cannot be observed without
excessive cost. Thus, the goal of policy is to setup
mechanisms that ensure that farmers know what
they are purchasing.
Ecological Protection
Pesticides are designed to be toxic to living organ-
isms. Because pesticide production is character-
ized by high fixed costs of research and develop-
ment, most pesticides marketed affect a broad
spectrum of organisms. Thus, it is not at all sur-
prising that pesticides could have adverse effects
on nontarget species. Adverse ecological effects
range from acute (e.g., fish kills from runoff of
synthetic pyrethroids or spills; bird kills from con-
sumption of granular soil insecticides or exposure
to drift and residues; bee kills from exposure to
drift) to long-term effects, such as the declines in
bird populations caused by bioaccumulation of
DDT and similar persistent compounds.
Ecological damages from pesticides are exter-
nalities, since the bulk of the damage is borne by
disparate members of the general public rather than
the farmers using the pesticides. The solutions to
these problems are necessarily collective and gen-
erally require public intervention due to high trans-
action costs of organization and free-riding. It is
important to recognize that the extent of damage is
affected by the types, formulations, and timing of
application of materials used, as well as by the
total amount of material applied.
Protecting Human Health and Safety
Many pesticides are toxic to humans to some de-
gree. Workers are exposed to pesticides during
production, mixing and loading, application, or
field work; the general public may be exposed via
aerial drift, drinking water (leaching of pesticides
into groundwater or runoff into surface water), or
residues on foods. Acute poisonings among farm
workers are well documented (see, for example,
Coye), as are some cases of long-term hazards
among chemical plant operatives (e.g., sterility
caused by DBCP, cancer caused by chlordime-
form). Animal bioassays suggest that pesticides
may have other long-term (chronic) effects, such
as cancer, birth defects, and genetic damage, al-
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though this evidence is controversial (see, for ex-
ample, Ames, Magaw, and Gold).
Worker safety and general public health prob-
lems differ in fundamental ways. It can be argued
that the central market failure in worker safety is
that workers may not be fully informed about the
risks posed by the chemicals they are exposed to,
hampering their ability to bargain over an adequate
wage premium. Exposure of the general public is
an externality problem in which privately orga-
nized solutions tend to be ruled out by the high
costs of providing information, as well as by costs
of organizing and free-riding.2
Dynamic Concerns
Because it must balance the risks and benefits of
pesticide use, EPA’s regulatory decisions are de-
termined in large measure by the pest-management
alternatives available. One of EPA’s long-run
goals is, thus, to encourage the development of
safer pesticides or pest-management technologies
that will allow it to increase the extent to which it
protects human health and the environment.
Instruments of Pesticide Regulation
EPA uses multi~le ~olicv instruments to meet
these multiple g~als ~f p&ticide regulation. The
set of usable instruments is, of course, circum-
scribed by the legislation governing pesticide reg-
ulation, mainly FIFRA and FFDCA.
The main context in which EPA exercises reg-
ulatory authority is registration. FIFRA requires
that pesticides be registered in order to be mar-
keted. The conditions under which a chemical is
registered specify (1) the crops it can be used on,
(2) the areas (usually states, sometimes counties)
in which it can be used for each crop, (3) the
specific pests it can be used for on each crop in
each area, (4) maximum allowable application
rates by pest, crop, and area, (5) required safety
precautions, and (6) specific restrictions on crop
rotations, time of use, etc. According to FIFRA,
these conditions of use must be such that the ben-
efits from use of a pesticide outweigh the risks
posed to the environment and to human safety and
health. Benefits under FIFRA refer to consumer
2 For example, it is extremely costly—and in some cases, technically
infeasible-to analyzetheresidues of all thepesticides used onany given
food or potentially occurring in drinking water. Labeling all of these
products is also extremely costly. These issues are discussed at greater
length below.L.ichtenberg Alternative Approaches to Pesticide Regulation 85
and farmer income; profits for the pesticide indus-
try are specifically excluded from consideration.
The registration process begins when a manu-
facturer or formulator submits a request, along
with specific data concerning effectiveness, envi-
ronmental fate and transport, and acute and
chronic toxicity for wildlife and humans.3 EPA
can approve the request, disapprove it, or require
the registrant to alter it in specific ways. If the
registration is not approved, the registrant may re-
spond with alterations of its own. The pesticide
industry is relatively highly concentrated; there are
only a few firms developing pesticidal chemicals.
Large investment requirements in R&D, the dom-
inant component of cost, deters entry. The risk-
benefit balance of any given chemical, which de-
termines EPA’s regulatory posture, is conditional
on the availability of substitutes and is thus ame-
nable to strategic manipulation by manufacturers.
As a result, the outcome of registration is the result
of a bargaining process between EPA and the reg-
istrant, rather than a unilateral decision made by
EPA.4
The registration process permits the use of a
number of different kinds of restrictions on pesti-
cide use; all are standards (quantity controls) rather
than market incentives. They include the follow-
ing.
Quantity Restrictions
The best-known restriction on the quantity of pes-
ticides that can be used is the all-or-nothing deci-
sion about whether to register a pesticide, that is,
whether a pesticide can be used in the U.S. FIFRA
also gives EPA latitude to engage in some fine-
tuning by allowing it to alter the maximum appli-
cation rate and number of treatments allowed per
3Two other imp+mtarrt processes arc the currentre-registrationprocess
and the ongoing special-review process. The former aims at bringing
registrations of pesticides that have been used for a long time up to
current standards. The latter is concernedwith pesticides currently inuse
which new information indicates may prise unforeseen problems. Pro-
cedural differences between these two and the registration process for
new pesticides are not important for the dkcussion here.
4 The case of the EBDC fungicides illustrates this. When EPA an-
nouncedit was reviewing the registrationof this familyof pesticides due
to new information about risk, the industry responded by proposing
voluntary cancellations on a sufficient number of crops to reduce esti-
mated dietary risk to a level acceptable to EPA. EPA, too, had a pre-
liminary list of potential cancellations-which differed substantially
from the industry’s. EPA ranked crops on the basis of grower and con-
sumer welfare, while the industry ranked them according to ita own
revenues. The two lists differed because there were more alternatives
available (hence benefits to growers and consumers were lower) for the
crops that generated the most revenue. These differences were largely
rendered moot by market-basket studies that showed much lower resi-
dues than EPA had assumed originally; but EPA would have had to
accept much or all of the indus@ list had the data supportedthe original
risk estimates.
season, and by permitting registration in some re-
gions and not others. However, this flexibility is
limited. For example, EPA can discriminate
among farms only on a regional (state, county)
level, even though in many cases discriminating
among individual farms would be preferable. EPA
also has relatively little control over maximum ap-
plication rates and numbers of treatments allowed:
Manufacturers set them to ensure adequate perfor-
mance of the pesticide under unusually bad condi-
tions as a way of protecting themselves against
liability for damages suffered by farmers with bad
infestations and are thus reluctant to accept sub-
stantial reductions.
Worker-Protection Measures
EPA can require specific worker-protection mea-
sures as a condition of registration. Farmers may
be required to provide workers with information
about the risks of pesticides and to notify them
about the presence of residues in treated fields.
EPA may also require the use of protective cloth-
ing or impose restrictions on production activities
after treatment. For example, it is illegal to send
workers into fields for a specified period of time
after application of pesticides that pose high risks
of poisoning. This form of regulation introduces
rigidities in scheduling farm operations that affect
the types of material chosen, application rates, and
timing of application (Lichtenberg, Spear, and Zil-
berman).
Other Production Restrictions
As part of the registration process, EPA can spec-
ify the types of formulations that can be used (e,g.,
granular versus spray), impose restrictions on crop
rotations, and set other conditions that alter the
incentives for choosing one chemical or applica-
tion method over another. For example, EPA re-
cently cancelled the registration of granular formu-
lations of the insecticide carbofuran because of
bird kills; spray formulations remain in legal use
because they do not pose the same risk. EPA pro-
hibits feeding unused portions of crops (vines,
straw, hulls) to animals after treatment with certain
pesticides (e.g., aldicarb), In some cases where
pesticide residues remain in the soil for more than
one season, EPA can restrict the types of crop that
can be grown in seasons after the pesticide was
used. For example, EPA forbids planting numer-
ous food crops for six months after the last treat-
ment with aldicarb. These types of regulation can
affect the selection of specific chemicals, types of
formulation, and timing of application.86 October 1992
Residue Tolerances
Regulation under FFDCA is aimed at protecting
consumers of foods treated with pesticides from
potential health effects from ingestion of pesticide
residues or metabolizes. EPA does this by setting a
tolerance specifying the maximum concentration
of a pesticide residue that may occur on foods.5
Residue tolerances are enforced by a Food and
Drug Administration inspection program; foods vi-
olating residue tolerances are seized. The residue
tolerance for pesticides not registered for use in the
U.S. is automatically set at zero. If a pesticide
does not degrade completely by the time the crop
reaches the market, the residue tolerance effec-
tively sets an upper bound on the amount applied
and/or the timing of application. Foster and Bab-
cock analyze the case of maleic hydrazide on to-
bacco, in which residue standards (on exports to
Germany) are a binding constraint determining ap-
plication rates.
Signals from Registration Decisions
To date, EPA’s principal attempts to influence pes-
ticide R&D have come indirectly through the sig-
nals it sends in making registration decisions. DDT
provides a case in point. In banning DDT (and the
entire family of chlorinated hydrocarbons in agri-
culture), EPA indicated that long-lived chemicals
had too great a potential for long-run environmen-
tal damage to be allowable; that is, only relatively
short-lived chemicals would be registered in the
future. EPA is currently discussing the potential of
more direct incentives for R&D using such instru-
ments as expedited registration or waivers for cer-
tain testing ;equireme;ts for
set of specific criteria.
Limitations of the Current
Regulatory Framework
pesticides meeting a
The preceding discussion indicates that the current
framework for pesticide regulation does not consist
simply of a broad, all-or-nothing decision about
whether or not to register (or cancel the registration
5 In most cases, pesticide residues on foods are regulated under Sec-
tion408of FFDCA, which mandates that tolerancesbe set to balance the
risks and benefits of pesticide use. In the relatively infrequentnumberof
cases where the concentration of residues increases durins processing,
pesticides are classified as foodadditives and are regulatedunderSection
409, the Delaney Clause, which prohibits the use of any substance
known to cause cancer in humans or animals but uses risk-benefit bal-
ancing for other types of heafrh effects. For further discussion, see
National Academy of Sciences,
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of) a chemical. This framework does possess a
considerable degree of flexibility in that usage re-
strictions can be calibrated to specific regions and
in that instruments like re-entry regulation, rota-
tional restrictions, and residue tolerances can alter
incentives affecting the choice of type of pesticide,
formulation, and timing of application.
There does remain the question of whether this
framework is sufficiently flexible. Put another
way, does this set of instruments correspond to the
outcome of a general social optimization model?
Would maximizing social welfare give a set of
instruments with precisely these characteristics?
The type of solution corresponding to the cur-
rent framework is one with a lot of corner solu-
tions, that is, one dominated by the registration/
cancellation decision. Loosely, cancellation or de-
nial of registration is optimal in cases where the
expected value of marginal damage to human
health and the environment caused by small usage
levels is large enough that it always exceeds the
marginal contribution to national income. Regis-
tration without restriction is warranted whenever
the opposite holds.
By and large, pesticide regulatory decisions
made to date fit this characterization reasonably
well. The benefits of pesticide use tend to be small
whenever many substitutes are available, either al-
ternative chemicals or land or labor (Zilberman et
al.). Most of EPA’s cancellation decisions have
involved chemicals for which substitute chemicals
of comparable efficacy and cost were available.
For example, when DDT was cancelled, farmers
were able to switch to alternative insecticides that
were roughly as effective and as cheap. Cotton
growers, for one, had been shifting steadily away
from DDT into organophosphates by the time that
DDT was cancelled, primarily because of the
spread of resistance to DDT (Carlson 1979). Fur-
thermore, most major crops have been in chronic
excess supply due to farm commodity programs
(Lichtenberg and Zilberman 1986b). The fact that
there is ample land to bring into production as a
substitute for pesticides on major crops (see, for
example, Knutson et al.) also suggests that the
marginal benefits of many cancelled pesticides
were low. Thus, the social-welfare losses from
canceling the registrations of many pesticides
have probably not been large.
In some cases, though, pesticide use may both
contribute substantially to national income and
pose significant risks to human health and the en-
vironment. So-called minor-use crops (particularly
fruits and vegetables) come to mind in this regard,
Commercial fruit and vegetable production is
largely concentrated in a few places, and theseLichtereberg Alternative Approaches to Pesticide Regulation 87
crops are highly vulnerable to pest damage. In
these cases, pesticide regulation should attempt to
reduce the amounts of a pesticide applied, or
change the formulation used or timing of applica-
tion in a way that equates the expected value of
marginal damage avoided with the marginal loss of
income.
The capacity of the current framework to effect
such changes in pesticide use is limited. Re-entry
regulation can accomplish such changes in cases
where worker protection is needed. Residue toler-
ances and preharvest intervals may help protect
consumers exposed via residues on foods. But the
current framework does not possess mechanisms
for inducing marginal changes in pesticide use to
protect wildlife, prevent runoff into surface waters
or leaching into groundwater, etc. One might think
that FIFRA does give EPA some flexibility in this
regard, for example, by allowing it to set maxi-
mum application rates or numbers of treatments
per season, As noted earlier, this option is usually
infeasible. Manufacturers set maximum applica-
tion rates and numbers of treatments per season
with an eye toward preventing liability suits for
product failure and thus calibrate them to ensure
efficacy during exceptionally severe infestations.
Similarly, FIFRA does not give EPA any mecha-
nism short of cancellation to discourage the use of
high-risk chemicals.
Alternatives to Regulatory Standards
The limitations on the flexibility of the current
framework suggest that alternative mechanisms
might be useful in supplementing the instruments
currently in use. This section considers the poten-
tial use of three types of policy instrument: liabil-
ity, provision of information, and taxes.
Liability
There has been a resurgence in recent years of
interest in liability as an alternative to environmen-
tal standards and Pigouvian taxes. Segerson has
argued that making farmers or (with appropriate
provisions for diligence on the part of farmers)
manufacturers liable for damages from groundwa-
ter contamination will provide optimal incentives
for pesticide use.
Liability is already a part of pesticide regulation:
Farmers can sue manufacturers for poor product
performance. As noted above, potential liability
considerations have tended to prevent manufactur-
ers from lowering maximum label application
rates. Thus, liability is useful in addressing one
class of goals of pesticide regulation, that of pro-
tecting pesticide users. But what about the remain-
ing goals—protecting workers, protecting the
health of the public at large, and protecting the
environment? The use of liability for ecological
protection is ruled out by the need to demonstrate
damage to specific individuals. Wildlife and envi-
ronmental systems are not private property, so no
grounds exist for seeking private remedies. More
broadly, Menell argues strongly that liability is a
poor instrument for rectifying externality problems
such as environmental damage or health and safety
risks to the general public caused by pesticide use.
Proving a causal linkage between pesticide use by
specific individuals and damage to specific indi-
viduals is virtually impossible; yet such linkages
are the fundamental basis of damage awards. Pro-
cedural requirements make use of the tort system
difficult, and use of the legal system is very costly.
In practice, damage awards are so variable that it is
difficult to gauge how the incentives for pesticide
use are affected by the observed outcomes. In
short, high transaction costs, overly stringent in-
formational needs, and excessive variability injury
behavior make liability an unattractive policy in-
strument for externality problems. Viscusi argues
on similar grounds that the tort system is largely
unsuitable for dealing with occupational safety is-
sues.6
Information
One can envision several ways in which the pro-
vision of additional information could make it pos-
sible for individuals to reach efficient solutions to
problems associated with pesticide use: (1) quan-
titative information on efficacy (e.g,, comparative
yields) could help farmers select among pesticides;
(2) information on the risks of pesticide exposure
could help workers bargain more effectively over
proper compensating wage differentials; and (3)
information on pesticides in drinking-water sup-
plies or residues on foods could help consumers
determine the appropriate averting behaviors. One
would not expect the provision of information to
be of much help in reducing the risk of environ-
mental damage external to the farm given the as-
sumption that farmers determine pesticide use pat-
terns out of self-interest.
6 Viscusi argues that workers’ compensation is more effective than
tort liabMy for improving worker safety, citing econometric evidence
indicatingthat injuryrates wouldbe fer higherinthe absenceof workers’
compensation. A simulation study by Davis, Caswell, snd Hsrper sug-
gests that experience-ratedworkers’compensationwouldbean effective
way of enforcing re-entry regulations for pesticides.88 October 1992 N.IARE
Of these three, provision of information proba-
bly has the greatest potential with respect to (2),
worker safety. There is considerable evidence that
the functioning of labor markets generates wage
differentials that compensate workers for bearing
excess risk, at least for acute health effects. There
is also evidence showing that workers respond to
new information in a way that is consistent with
optimizing behavior (Viscusi and O’Connor).
Complete information about risk is, of course, a
necessary condition for these wage differentials to
compensate workers fully.
Provision of more information will not neces-
sarily lead to greater safety for farm workers. The-
ory suggests that full information will permit
workers to obtain full compensation for bearing
additional risk on the job; these higher wages will
induce employers to enhance safety only if the sav-
ings in wage premiums outweigh the cost of safety
measures. Most farm workers are poor. Many are
illegal migrants, earning far higher wages than
they would expect to receive at home. It seems
plausible that most would demand low compensa-
tion for risk-bearing relative to workers who are
better off, suggesting further that job safety would
not be affected much by additional information.
There are also theoretical grounds for question-
ing the efficacy of information in enhancing
worker safety. Complete information may not be
sufficient because workers may not be fully ratio-
nal, in the strict economic sense of the term. For
example, Akerlof and Dickens demonstrate that
compensating wage differentials do not arise in
cases where workers exhibit cognitive dissonance.
It is also not clear whether workers fully take into
account chronic risks in wage bargaining.
In sum, it seems that providing workers with
information about the health risks of the chemicals
used, about application rates, and about likely ex-
posure could be an important adjunct to current
pesticide policy, rather than a substitute for direct
regulation. The regulations on worker safety re-
cently issued by EPA do call for greater notifica-
tion, although they fall short of full disclosure;
interestingly, the farm community argued strongly
against notification on the grounds of excessive
cost.
EPA’s ability to provide farmers with efficacy
information is more problematic. The value of
having such information is attested to by the suc-
cess of integrated pest management programs
across the country. The issue for EPA is whether it
can play a role by requiring manufacturers to pro-
vide such information as part of the registration
process. There is good reason to believe that this
information is best generated and disseminated at
the regional or local level. Pesticide effectiveness
depends heavily on environmental conditions such
as temperature, rainfall, initial pest population
sizes, population sizes of predator or competitor
species, and so on. Effectiveness varies across pro-
duction regions as well as from year to year. Fac-
tors that are important in one area may not be
important in another area. Furthermore, training
may be needed to give farmers sufficient under-
standing to utilize a more information-intensive
pest-management strategy (Pingali and Carlson);
training requirements, too, are likely to vary across
regions. Efficacy information presented from a na-
tional perspective would likely be either overly
simple or overly complex.
It is well known that averting behavior is gen-
erally an important component of efficient solu-
tions to externality problems (Cease; Olson and
Zeckhauser). Providing consumers with informa-
tion about pesticide residues in drinking water or
on foods could enable them to engage in efficient
averting behavior and might make socially effi-
cient pesticide regulation possible. However, the
costs of providing this information are likely to be
high. First, testing water or produce for all the
pesticides of potential concern is extremely expen-
sive when feasible and often can be done only by
a few advanced analytical chemistry laboratories;
for example, a key component of EPA’s recent
survey of pesticide residues in groundwater was
the development of analytical methods for testing
multiple residues. Most laboratories are not
equipped to conduct such tests. Residue levels
vary over time (groundwater) and shipments of
produce, so continuous testing would be neces-
sary. Publicizing this information, for example by
labeling produce, is also likely to be costly. This is
particularly true for foods, since the produce sold
at the retail level generally comes from many dif-
ferent growers, each using a somewhat different
mix of pesticides; thus, labeling would be difficult
and expensive to implement. Finally, consumers
would need to invest substantial time and effort in
developing the necessary information base and
skills for processing this information; this, too, is
likely to be a very costly activity,
Another alternative would be to test and label
produce as simply residue-free,’ Experience with
experiments along these lines is not encouraging,
7 Yet another possibility would be to Iahel produce as meeting EPA
standards for residues in feeds. If aflproduce marketed does meet these
standards (as it should to be legally saleable), then this amounts to
providing additional information about current regulation, rather than
beingan alternativeto that regulation, Suchlabelingcould be warranted,
but it is obviously not a substitute for direct regulation,Lichtenberg Alternative Approaches to Pesticide Regulation 89
Several supermarket chains have experimented
with this approach. Others have tried organic-
produce sections. All seem to have abandoned
their experiments due to lack of demand: There
does not appear to be a sufficient number of con-
sumers willing to pay a high enough premium on
produce to justify the expense of testing and label-
ing or of maintaining an organic-produce section.
This does not mean that regulation is not at all
justified, that is, the costs of regulating residues on
foods outweigh the benefits. In the first place,
these programs provide reductions in residues be-
low the EPA’s residue standards. In the second
place, marginal private testing costs (or additional
cost of producing and marketing organic food) are
likely to exceed the marginal costs of the national
monitoring program conducted by FDA. Thus,
these experiences do not show that the costs of
FDA’s monitoring program outweigh the benefits
of meeting EPA’s residue standards, nor do they
rule out the possibility that more stringent residue
standards could be justified in some cases.
In sum, high transaction costs suggest that in-
formation is a poor substitute for direct regulation
in this context.
Pesticide Taxes
A third alternative to direct regulation is to impose
Pigouvian taxes, giving farmers an incentive to
reduce pesticide use to socially optimal levels, As
Zilberman et al. note, taxes permit greater flexi-
bility than direct regulation. Carlson (1977) has
argued that pesticide taxes are preferable to direct
regulation in that they are likely to involve less
error because (1) there is more uncertainty about
marginal damage from pesticide use than about
demand (marginal benefit) and (2) marginal dam-
age is likely to be more inelastic than demand. 8
Taxes can affect whether a chemical will be
used at all as well as application rates. A given
pesticide will be used by farmers for whom the
marginal net benefit of zero use exceeds the tax,
and each farmer will adjust pesticide use to equate
the marginal net benefit with the tax. Thus, taxes
allow fine-tuning at the farm level, while direct
regulation can discriminate at best only down to
the county level. In contrast to direct regulation,
taxes allow regulators to influence application
rates in a continuous (rather than all-or-nothing)
manner. Furthermore, taxes can be varied accord-
8 In Weitzman’s terminology, price inshuments lie tases are prefer-
ablewheneverthe benefits functionhas lowcurvature relativeto the cost
function (pesticide demand is more elastic than damage); greater uncer-
tainty about dumage increases thk advantage.
ing to indicators of environmental risk, such as
leachability and acute or chronic toxicity, allowing
regulators to influence farmers’ choices among
pesticides. Taxes of this kind would also exert in-
fluence on pesticide R&D, thus addressing EPA’s
long-run concerns.
In theory, taxes can substitute completely for
usage restrictions. As a practical matter, setting the
optimal tax for each chemical remains problem-
atic. Optimal Pigouvian taxes should be set to the
expected value of marginal damages at the optimal
level of pesticide use. But the expected value of
marginal damages is difficult to quantify; cer-
tainly, numerical estimates are not available. The
difficulty is compounded by the fact that the opti-
mal tax should vary across chemicals and regions,
suggesting that computing these taxes may be ex-
tremely costly. Furthermore, we have very little
evidence about the productivity of specific pesti-
cides or about pesticide demand at the level of
individual chemicals; yet this information is nec-
essary to estimate optimal taxes.
Comparing ideal taxes to an admittedly imper-
fect system of direct regulation is obviously unfair.
A more reasonable comparison would be between
taxes and direct regulation aimed at reducing the
total amount of a pesticide used to a predetermined
level believed to involve acceptably low risks to
human health and the environment. The key dif-
ference here is that setting taxes requires informat-
ion about pesticide demand, which direct regula-
tion does not. The trade-off is that taxes are po-
tentially more efficient and thus involve lower
losses of income to achieve the desired level of
environmental protection. Whether this is true is
an empirical question, and one worth investigat-
ing.
There are forms of direct regulation for which
taxes probably cannot substitute. Taxes cannot be
counted onto alter timing of application: pesticides
are storable, so that purchasing and use decisions
can be separated in time. This suggests that taxes
cannot substitute for re-entry or preharvest inter-
vals, or for residue tolerances, both of which are
used to control timing of application and/or other
farm operations.9
Implications for Economic Research
Pesticide regulation has assumed a heightened im-
portance in recent years. As time passes, more and
9 A system of fines for excessive residues on feeds could be used for
feed safety but would not ensure the safety of harvest workers.90 October 1992 NJARE
more is known about the adverse effects of pesti-
cide use, leading to increased demand for regula-
tion. Pesticides seem to have captured the public
imagination as a major source of risk, further in-
creasing demand for government intervention. At
the same time, the re-registration process currently
underway at EPA has led to voluntary cancella-
tions of many pesticide uses; this is particularly
true for fruits and vegetables and other “minor
use” crops, in whose production pesticides play a
major role.
In this context, it is important to develop ways
of improving the efficiency of pesticide regulation.
The instruments currently used to regulate pesti-
cides tend to permit relatively little flexibility. The
predominant instrument is an all-or-nothing deci-
sion about whether to permit use of a chemical.
Selective registration by region or crop and alter-
native instruments such as re-entry regulation or
residue tolerances give EPA some flexibility in
dealing with specific problems, but this, too, is
limited.
This paper considers three alternative ap-
proaches: liability law, provision of information,
and taxes.
Liability law currently affects manufacturers’
efforts to provide efficacious products, addressing
one of EPA’s three main goals. It is unlikely to be
of much use for dealing with externality or worker-
safety problems.
Provision of information is likely to be most
useful in addressing worker-safety issues: more
complete information should, in theory, allow
workers to bargain more effectively over wage-
safety trade-offs and thus be compensated ade-
quately for the risk they bear (although greater
safety will result only if the increased wage differ-
entials exceed the cost of enhancing safety). The
extent to which information can substitute for di-
rect regulation, though, is not clear. We do not
know whether wage differentials compensate
workers for chronic risks, for instance. There is
also reason to believe that the illegal-immigrant
status of many farm workers allows growers to
exert market power. Many farm workers are
poorly educated; their ability to process risk infor-
mation is also open to question. Finally, direct
regulation may prove to be less costly than provid-
ing sufficiently complete information. In thk re-
gard, it is noteworthy that growers oppose greater
notification during the recent negotiations over
farm-worker protection regulations. It would be
interesting to know whether they did so on politi-
cal-economic grounds (because their own costs
would be lower, for example) or because they felt
that direct regulation would be more efficient. Fur-
ther research along these lines is needed.
Taxes appear to be the most useful instmment
for either supplementing or replacing direct regu-
lation in most instances. Properly calibrated taxes
should induce socially optimal application rates,
At the very least, taxes can be used to meet the
same goals that direct regulation now does: suffi-
ciently high taxes should eliminate the use of cer-
tain pesticides except for emergency situations.
Furthermore, varying taxes according to indicators
of potential ecological or human-health damage
should encourage the use of safer pesticides and
discourage the use of more hazardous ones, and, in
the long run, encourage R&D to focus on more
desirable pesticide characteristics. Taxes are prob-
ably preferable to direct regulation in the second-
best, Weitzman sense because pesticide demand is
most likely more elastic than marginal damage
from pesticides and because uncertainty about
damage is large.
We do not, however, have an information base
that would permit us to implement pesticide taxes,
even to achieve risk standards comparable to those
used today in direct regulation. We know too little
about the productivity of and demand for classes of
pesticides, much less individual chemicals. We
know too little about substitutability between indi-
vidual chemicals and between pesticides and other
factors of production like land and labor. We know
too little about the expected value of external dam-
ages from pesticide use. We probably know too
little even to set targets for total applications in a
region in anything but a rather arbitrary way. We
do know that all of these vary across regions and
that they are stochastic, making estimation more
complex.
At present, estimates of pesticide productivity
and demand are derived from the opinions of crop-
production experts. These generally come in the
wrong form to fit economic models: they are esti-
mates of average, rather than marginal, changes in
yield and cost due to registration or cancellation of
a chemical. Moreover, they are often distorted by
special pleading (see for example Ayer and
Conklin). It would be preferable to have produc-
tivity and demand estimates based on observed be-
havior under field conditions, that is, econometric
estimates. At the very least, such estimates could
be used to validate expert opinion. There has been
some progress in this regard in recent years,
mainly at the level of classes of chemicals. Lich-
tenberg and Zilberman (1986a) developed a frame-
work for understanding pesticide productivity, and
Babcock, Lichtenberg, and Zilberman, and
Carrasco-Tauber and Moffitt have applied it to ap-
ples and major crops, respectively. Foster and
Babcock have demonstrated a method for estimat-
ing pesticide demand in cases where residue con-L.ichtenberg Alternative Approaches to Pesticide Regulation 91
straints are binding. Considerably more informa-
tion is needed, however, especially at the level of
individual chemicals and their production relation-
ships with alternative chemicals and other factors
of production.
Data availability has been a major limitation on
the ability to estimate pesticide productivity econo-
metrically. We need information at least at the
level of classes of chemicals, at best at the level of
individual chemicals. This information should be
collected from a single growing region to ensure
similarity of growing conditions. It also needs a
time-series component to capture price effects,
since pesticide prices tend not to vary much within
a single region. It would be preferable to have
observations on pest-infestation levels, or at least
on environmental conditions (heat and humidity
over the season, etc.) that could serve as proxies
for them. Very few databases of this kind exist.
Some data of this sort have been collected as part
of integrated pest management efforts, but these
data sets are usually designed by entomologists or
plant scientists and tend to skimp on economic
information such as pesticide prices or the use and
prices of non-pest control inputs. Data on farm
production collected by the Economic Research
Service (e.g., the Farm Costs and Returns Survey)
are designed for budgeting purposes. In most
cases, it is impossible to obtain both prices and
quantities simultaneously. More detailed surveys
conducted by the Economic Research Service on
specific crops contain information on acreage
treated with numerous individual pesticides but no
information on application rates or prices.
A final item of interest is the structure of the
pesticide industty. The industry does not fit the
perfectly competitive model well. Production costs
are dominated by the high fixed costs of R&D,
which tend to deter entry. The terms of pesticide
regulation, that is, the specifications listed on the
pesticide label, are determined by bilateral bar-
gaining between the registrant and EPA. The con-
text for this bargaining is determined by the supply
of pest controls, which comes from an imperfectly
competitive industry. Thus, the context in which
EPA makes its regulato~ decisions is dominated
by the structure of the pesticide industry, making
that structure an interesting and important topic for
further study.
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